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THE CHANGE OF VENUE PROBLEM
HARRY L. CRUMPACKER*

Strictly construed the term "change of venue" means
a change of the place of trial from one county or district
to another. In an early New Hampshire case the court said,
"Whenever or however the practice originated, it became
thoroughly engrafted upon the common law, long before the
independence of this country, and from that time forth, not
only has the practice prevailed in the courts of England,
but the power is now exercised by the courts of very many
if not all of our states, either by force of express statute
or the adoption of the common law into the jurisprudence
of the same."'In Indiana the right to a change of venue and the procedure for its exercise are wholly statutory and here the term
is also used to denote the transfer of a cause from the regular judge of the court in which it is pending to a special judge
of the same court whose jurisdiction is limited to the disposition of such cause only. The reasons that prompted the
legislature to provide for a change of venue from the judge
in civil and criminal actions are fundamental; the causes for
his disqualification, as specified by statute, are sound and
the right must be recognized as essential to the procurement
of fair trials in those instances where statutory grounds
exist for the exercise of the right.
In providing machinery for the exercise of this right,
the legislature has not been so wise. There are now in effect
*

Judge, Indiana Appellate Court

1.

Cochecho Railroad v. Farrington (1853), 26 N.H. 428, 436.
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12 statutes, if we include those of the criminal code, applicable to various situations and providing many methods of
selecting a special judge to try a cause in which the regular
or presiding judge has been disqualified. 2 Out of this prolixity of methods, all designed to insure a litigant in his
right to have his case heard by a fair and impartial judge,
has grown a multitude of abuses that have brought no credit
to the bar and have subjected the courts of the state to lay
criticism for long and unreasonable delay in the disposition
of business.
The Civil Practice Code of 1881 recognized a litigant's
basic right to have a change of venue from the judge who,
in regular course, would hear his case. It specified grounds
.upon which the right could be exercised and set up the machinery whereby a special judge was selected and appointed.
The act contained five sections all but one of which still
stand, substantially as enacted, and constitute a part of our
present civil code.3 The first of these sections, provides four
grounds for a change of venue from the judge: (1) That
he was engaged as counsel in the cause prior to his election
or appointment or is otherwise interested in the action;
(2) that he is of kin to either party; (6) that he is a
material witnesg; and (7) that he is biased and prejudiced.'
The existence of any of these grounds, in a particular case,
must be shown by affidavit and statistics reveal that bias
and prejudice is most commonly alleged. The right to a
change of venue in a civil action, granted by this statute,
has been extended, either by judicial construction of the
word "civil" or by express legislative enactment, 5 to almost
every character of proceeding adversary.
Section 257 of the Civil Practice Code of 1881 provided
that: "When a change of venue is granted (from the judge)
the Court or Judge shall call a Judge of any Circuit, Superior
or other Court of general jurisdiction, or any Judge of the
2.

Ind. Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.), ch. 38, §255-251; Ind Acts 1903, ch.
195; Ind Acts 1905, ch. 96, as amended; Ind. Acts 1907, ch. 1;
Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 169; Ind Acts 1907, ch. 59; Ind. Acts 1911,
ch. 159, as amended by Acts 1919, ch. 17; Ind. Acts 1913, ch. 122,
as amended by Acts 1929, ch. 6; Ind. Acts 1913, ch. 139, as
amended by Acts 1935, ch. 71; Ind. Acts 1937, ch. 103; Ind.
Acts 1937, ch. 221; Ind. Acts 1937, ch. 7; Ind. Acts 1937, ch. 290.
S. §§225 to 259, §257 repealed by Acts 1905, ch. 96, §1.
4. Burns' Ind. Ann. Stat. (1933) §2-1401
5. Id. §§2-1402 and 2-1403.

19451

THE CHANGE OF VENUE PROBLEM28

285

Supreme Court to preside in such case, and try the same;
or, if it shall be difficult, in the opinion of the Court, for
any cause, to procure the attendance of such Judge, the Court,
in order to prevent delay may appoint any competent and
disinterested attorney of this State, in good standing, to act
as Judge in such cause,". 6 This procedure was deemed adequate until 1905 when, possibly to prevent arbitrary choice
of a successor by a judge willing to favor one of the litigants,
§2-1409, Burns' 1933, was enacted.7 This section as amended
in 1907, requires the judge from whom the change is taken,
if the parties fail to agree on a special judge, "to nominate
three (3) competent and disinterested persons, each of whom
shall be an available judge or member of the bar of this
state, to be submitted to the parties.," each of whom shall
strike one name and the person whose name remains becomes
the special judge. If either party fails to exercise his right
to strike within the time limited the regular judge chooses
from the remaining names.
It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which the
machinery provided by this statue for the selection and
appointment of a special judge would not be adequate to
insure litigants a fair trial. It is obvious, except where the
change is taken for the purpose of delay, that counsel, by
conscientious effort, could agree on a special judge and the
fact that they do not do so, in many instances, indicates that
the underlying reason for the change is not within the purview of the statute that gives them the right to take it.
Notwithstanding the adequacy of existing law, in 1937
the legislature passed two acts pertaining to the selection
of special judges, each of which unfolds an elaborate and
novel scheme to accomplish the purpose.3 The first of these
acts" it would seem, is the source of most of the abuse of
the basic right to a change of venue from the judge that has
become so prevalent in recent years. It was so carelessly
written that construction by the Supreme Court approaching
judicial legislation was required to give it application to civil
actions. 10 Under this statute an applicant, by objecting to the
6. Ind. Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.), ch. 38, §257, p. 286.
7. Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 96, §1, p. 164, amended by Acts 1907, ch. 81,

§1, p. 108.
8. Ind. Acts 1937, ch. 85, p. 443; Ind. Acts 1937, ch. 103, p. 481.
9. Bums' Ind. Ann. Stat. (1942 Supp) §2-1430.
10. State ex rel. 1625 E. Wash. R. Co. v. Markey, Judge 212 Ind.
59, 7 N. E. (2d) 989 (1937).
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submission of a list of prospects by the regular or presiding
judge, may require the clerk of the Supreme Court to list
three names from which, by striking, a special judge is to
be selected. In making up this list the clerk is limited to the
names of judges of circuit courts of "adjoining counties," or
to members of the bar of the county where the action is
pending, and "adjacent counties." It will be noted that superior, criminal, or probate court judges may not be named and
whether the words "adjoining" and "adjacent" are used
synonymously is not clear. In its practical application the
clerk of the Supreme Court has frequently been unable to
find available lawyers in some of the smaller counties, and,
with the approval of the Supreme Court, has construed "adjacent" to include the second tier of counties on either side
of that in which the action is pending.
Since January 1, 1944, the clerk of the Supreme Court
has kept a separate record book in which complete data on
lists submitted by him is recorded. This record discloses
that from January 1, to November 1, 1944, he has certified
to trial courts the appalling number of 536 lists of which
the following is a partial breakdown: In 34 counties no list
was requested and in 19 counties only one. Counties requesting as many as 5 and less than 10 were Decatur, Delaware,
Gibson, Hancock, Jay, Jefferson, Knox, Lawrence, Owen,
Posey and Warrick. Counties requesting 10 or more were
Allen,, Hamilton, Hendricks, Lake, Marion, Marshall, Porter,
Spencer, Vanderburgh and Vigo. All other counties asked
less than 5. In Allen County with 3 courts there were only
10 lists requested while Hendricks and Marshall, each with
only a circuit court, requested 10 lists each. The worst
offenders among the smaller counties were Hamilton, 26;
Porter, 21; and Spencer, 12. The figures for Vanderburgh
are 27; for Vigo, 26; for Lake, 91; and for Marion, 150.
All this, of course, does not include instances where special
judges were selected by agreement of the parties or from
lists submittd by the regular judges from whom changes of
venue were taken.
The clerk of the Supreme Court has furnished data in
five instances which illustrate the frequent and typical results of the practical application of this statute. In each
of these cases there was, perhaps, some unnecessary delay
preceding certification to the clerk of the filing of the affi-
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davit for a change of venue and, later, in striking names
from the list submitted and getting the selected judge qualified and ready to hear the case, but in the main part the
unreasonable delay, shown in each case, can be attributed to
infirmaties in the statute.
In a case pending in Decatur County the first list was
certified by the clerk on March 26, 1942. The special judge
selected from this list qualified and acted as such until January 14, 1944, when a change of venue was taken from him.
The clerk's second list was certified on January 15, 1944, and
the judge selected refused to serve. A third list was certified on February 4, 1944, with the same result and on June
8, 1944, a list was finally submitted from which it was possible to procure a special judge. The various lists included
the names of all the circuit judges of adjoining counties and
none of them was satisfactory to both parties except the
first one selected and he was subsequently unseated by the
second bias and prejudice affidavit.
Seven months elapsed in the process of selecting a special judge in a case pending in the Lake Superior Court in
Gary. Three lists were necessary to effect the purpose.
The ineffectiveness of the statute is strikingly illustrated by a deplorable situation in a Spencer County case.
Eight months have elapsed since the services of a special
judge were required and as far as the record in the office
of the clerk of the Supreme Court discloses, none has yet
been selected. Six lists have been certified. The first was
recalled because one of the attorneys named was related to
an attorney of record in the case. To insure against such
occurrences it would be necessary for the clerk to investigate
each individual whose name is submitted as a prospective
special judge. His relationship to lawyers employed in the
case and to all of the parties, and the possibility of his previous employment in the litigation or of his being a witness
at the trial thereof are all matters that would have to be
determined. When we realize that in the ten months from
January 1, to November 1, 1944, the clerk was required to
certify 536 lists of three names each, requiring 1608 separate
investigations, if the possibility of submitting the name of
a disqualified person was to be avoided, the impossibilty of
complying with the statutory injunction that "competent" and
"disinterested" persons shall be selected, becomes apparent.
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The second list in the Spencer County case was recalled because one of the judges named lived in Vanderburgh County
which does not adjoin. The judge from the third list refused
to serve. The one selected from the fourth list qualified but
later resigned. The fifth selection refused to qualify and
there is no record in the clerk's office as to what occurred
in connection with the sixth list.
A period of six months was required to get a special
judge to try a case in the Marion Superior Court, Room 1.
Five lists were submitted and each of the lawyers selected
from the first four lists declined to serve.
In a case pending in the Vanderburgh Circuit Court each
party took a change of venue from the judge. The first list
certified May 28, 1943, contained the names of three circuit
court judges,,one of whom was selected. He qualified and
acted until January 18, 1944, when the second change of
venue was taken. It required the submission of three more
lists before a lawyer was selected who would agree to serve.
Eight months elapsed between the submission of the first
and last lists.
The process of selecting and qualifying a special judge
to try a case in which the regular judge has been disqualified should not be difficult or prolonged. Under the provisions of §257 of the Civil Practice Act of 1881 it seldom
took more than a .few days. The regular judge knew his
neighboring colleagues on the bench and members of the bar.
He knew their relationships to the parties and counsel engaged in the litigation and could learn very quickly as to
the willingness of any of them to serve. The sole objection
to the law, as it then stood, rested in the arbitrary power
it vested in a judge who had been disqualified, usually for
bias and prejudice, to select his successor. Perhaps the
objection was more fancied than real because it presupposes
that a biased and.prejudiced judge could and would find
another who was also biased and prejudiced. However that
may be, it cannot be denied that we now have on our statute
books a clumsy, carelessly written and ineffective law pertaining to the selection of special judges which, by reason
of its very ineffectiveness,, appeals to many litigants and
lawyers as an apt and appropriate instrument to procure long
and unreasonable delay, in litigation of which they are not
anxious to dispose.
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There is no disposition on the part of anyone concerned
with the problem to deny to litigants the privilege of a
change of judge to the end that they will be assured a fair
trial but the situation, as it presently exists, demands a
remedy. The Judicial Council, during the past year, has
given the problem serious consideration, and is of the opinion
that either of two remedies should be adopted: (1) The
entire matter should be taken over by the Supreme Court
and handled under its rule making power, or (2) all procedural statutes should be repealed and one comprehensive
and workable act passed in their stead. There is much to be
said for the first plan. The Supreme Court is fully aware
of the difficulties its clerk has had and the onerous duties
and responsibilities cast upon him concerning a matter which
logically has no connection with his office. The court, by
knowledge and training, is in position to formulate rules
that will preserve to litigants the basic right to a change
of venue and at the same time set up an efficient and speedy
method of obtaining special judges which will eliminate any
abuse of the right that now exists or may develop.
The power of the Supreme Court to deal with changes
of venue under its rule making authority may be doubted by
some. Article 4, § 22, of the Constitution of Indiana provides as follows: "The General Assembly shall not pass
local or special laws, in any of the following cases, that is
to say: * * * (4) Providing for changing the venue in civil
and criminal cases:" It has been argued that the constitution, by expressly prohibiting the enactment of special or
local laws concerning changes of venue, recognizes the inherent and exclusive power of the legislature to deal with
the subject in all other respects. In 1937 the legislature
passed the following act. "All statutes relating to practice
and procedure in any of the courts of this state shall have,
and remain in, force and effect only as herein provided. The
Supreme Court shall have the power to adopt, amend and
rescind rules of court which shall govern and control practice and procedure in all the courts of this state; such rules
to be promulgated and to take effect under such rules as
the Supreme Court shall adopt, and thereafter all laws in
conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect." 11
It would seem that this language is sufficiently broad
to embrace the procedural aspects of the appointent of
11. Acts 1937, ch. 91, p. 459.
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special judges but the Supreme Court might be reluctant to
take such a position in view of the fact that the act relates
to its own powers. To put the matter beyond controversy
a simple statute could be enacted providing in substance that
special judges may be appointed in all instances now authorized by law in accordance with such reasonable procedural
rules pertaining to the steps necessary to obtain the appointment of such judges and the method of their selection as
the Supreme Court may, from time to time, adopt.
If it should be considered that the power to provide a
procedure to effectuate changes of venue is vested by the
constitution exclusively in the legislature and cannot be delegated to the judiciary, the second remedy, suggested above,
should be pursued. With that in mind the Judicial Council
prepared and sponsored, in the 1945 session of the General
Assembly, a bill for an act which is set out in full as an
appendix hereto. This bill was lost in the volume of proposed
legislation and was not presented to the legislature for passage but it is the belief of those who have given the matter
study that, if enacted, it would go a long way in the solution
of the problem, and it is offered here for the consideration
of the bar and all persons interested. Its salient features
are: (1) An opportunity for counsel to agree on a special
judge; (2) the right of the Supreme Court to appoint the
regular judge of any court in the state, except justices of
peace and magistrates, to serve as a special judge anywhere
in the state; (3) an appointment by the Supreme Court
constitutes a mandate to serve; and (4) fairly adequate
compensation for the services of such special judge together
with traveling expenses at the same rate per diem.
The great majority of our trial judges receive no compensation in addition to their base salary paid by the state.
It is believed that from these judges a list of those available and willing to serve will soon develop through the practical operation of the law. It is reasonable to expect that
such judges will be scattered geographically throughout the
state and thus a stranger to the subject matter, parties, and
counsel, in any given case, will be available without delay to
act as a special judge in the event of a change of venue
therein. The opportunity afforded judges in the smaller
counties, receiving base pay only, to add materially to their
salaries should make the mandate of the Supreme Court
welcome.
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APPENDIX
A BILL FOR AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION I OF AN
ACT ENTITLED "AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION I OF
AN ACT ENTITLED 'AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE
APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL JUDGES IN CHANGE OF
VENUE AND CERTAIN OTHER CASES AND DECLARING
AN EMERGENCY', APPROVED MARCH 4, 1911; REPEALING ALL LAWS IN CONFLICT HEREWITH AND
DECLARING AN EMERGENCY", (BEING CHAPTER 70,
ACTS 1919).
SECTION I. Be it enacted by the General Assembly
of the State of Indiana,-That Section 1 of the above entitled
act, being Chapter 70, Acts 1919, be amended to read as
follows:
SECTION 1. Hereafter, whenever a change of venue
is taken from the presiding judge in any circuit, superior,
criminal, probate, juvenile, municipal or city court in this
state, or in any case where the presiding jadge, whether
he be the regular, special or pro tem judge of said court, is
disqualified from any cause to try such action, if the parties
in such action shall agree in writing or in open court, to
the transfer of the action to another court in this state
to try such action, it shall be the duty of the court wherein
said action is pending, to transfer to the court, or to appoint
as special judge such judge or attorney, so agreed upon.
In the absence of such agreement, it shall be the duty of the
court, within two days from the date such change of venue
is granted or such disqualification become effective, to certify, under seal of said court, to the Supreme Court of
Indiana., that such presiding judge is disqualified to try
said action and specify therein the reasons for such disqualification and that the parties litigant have failed to
agree upon a transfer or a special judge to try said action.
The Supreme Court, within a reasonable time thereafter,
shall appoint the regular judge of any court in the State,
except magistrates or justices of the peace, as a special
judge to try said action. Any such judge so appointed by
the Supreme Court, shall by reason of such appointment, be
obligated to act as such special judge and shall forthwith
file his appointment and oath with the clerk of the court
wherein said action is pending, which appointment and oath
shall be entered by the clerk upon the orderbook of said
court and such judge shall thereupon have power to hear
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and determine said action, until the same is finally disposed
of, or a change of venue thereof is taken in proper cases.
Any court to which an action is transferred under this Act
shall have jurisdiction of the action. Said special judge,
whether appointed by the trial court upon agreement of the
parties,' or by the Supreme Court, shall be allowed and paid
five cents for each mile necessarily traveled in the performance of his duties as special judge and shall be paid as
compensation for his services the sum of twenty-five dollars
($25.00) per day and, in computing the time for which he
is entitled to compensation, the time necessarily required for
travel from his home to the place of holding court and return
shall be included within the time of actual services on the
bench. Said compensation and travel expense shall be paid
as follows: On presentation of an order made by the court
for the allowance, specifying the time of service, supported
by an affidavit of the special judge that he actually served
such time and traveled the mileage claimed, and an affidavit
of the regular judge, if any, stating the reason for the service of such special judge, the same shall be paid out of the
county treasury for which the county shall have credit on
settlement of the treasurer with the State. A special judge,
appointed by virtue of this Act, shall have jurisdiction to
hear and determine any action, or matter connected therewith, in which he is appointed in vacation or term time.
As used in this Act "action" includes all civil and criminal
actions and other judicial proceedings.
SECTION 2. All laws or parts of laws. pertaining to
the method, manner or procedure by which a special judge
is to be selected and appointed in any action wherein the
presiding judge has been disqualified for any reason, in the
courts specified in Section 1, are hereby repealed, provided
however, that nothing in this Act shall deprive a special
judge heretofore appointed, qualified and acting by virtue
of any law hereby repealed, of jurisdiction to hear to completion and decision any action pending before him upon
the date this Act become effective, and PROVIDED FURTHER that nothing in this Act shall in any way abridge,
change or modify the right of any party litigant to a change
of venue from a presiding judge as now provided by law.
SECTION 3. The Supreme Court is authorized by rule
or order to regulate the administration of and the procedure
for carrying into effect the provisions of this Act.

